MISAPPROPRIATORS, TIPPEES AND THE
INTENT-TO-BENEFIT RULE: WHAT WE CAN
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INTRODUCTION
In early 1997, while in the process of dissolving their marriage,
David and Donna Yun were discussing their post-nuptial settlement
1
agreement.
David, president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc.,
explained to his wife that the value of Scholastic stock included in his
statement of assets reflected an anticipated $10-per-share decline in
value due to an unfavorable earnings report, which was to be
2
announced within the week. At her husband’s request, Mrs. Yun
3
agreed not to disclose this confidence to anyone except her lawyer.
Shortly thereafter, two days before the earnings announcement,
Donna Yun telephoned her attorney, Sam Weiss, from her real-estate
office to discuss the assets statement. Jerry Burch, a co-worker and
fellow sales agent, was present and standing within feet of Mrs. Yun as
she explained the Scholastic stock price discrepancy to Weiss. That
4
evening, Mrs. Yun and Burch attended a trade banquet together,
5
where they discussed the Scholastic earnings situation.
∗
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1
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003). See generally M. Anne
Kaufold, Casenote, Defining Misappropriation: The Spousal Duty of Loyalty and the
Expectation of Benefit, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1489 (2004) (setting forth facts and holdings
of Yun).
2
Id. On the weekend of February 15–16, 1997, Scholastic was trading at $65 per
share. The poor earnings announcement was to be made on February 20, and David
Yun anticipated a drop in price to about $55 per share. Id.
3
Id. at 1267 & n.4.
4
Id. at 1268.
5
SEC v. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356–57 (M.D. Fla. 2001), vacated by 327 F.3d
1263 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268. Over the course of the SEC’s
subsequent investigation Burch and Yun changed their story regarding when and
where the tip occurred. It is not entirely clear whether the alleged tip occurred as a
result of Mrs. Yun’s telephone call to her lawyer or at the party later that evening,
and the matter was submitted for the jury’s consideration. Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at
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The next morning, the day before Scholastic’s earnings
announcement, Jerry Burch placed an order through his broker to
6
purchase approximately $20,000 worth of two-day puts.
The
following day the price of Scholastic stock dropped forty percent in
response to the earnings report, closing at $36 per share. Burch then
sold his options, reaping a profit of more than one quarter of a
7
million dollars.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
“Commission”) began an investigation into Burch’s trading activities
8
within hours of his covering trades. As a result of its investigation,
the Commission brought a civil action against both Donna Yun and
Burch, alleging that the pair had violated section 10(b) of the
9
10
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder. Since there was no contention of any wrongdoing by
David Yun in disclosing the earnings information to his wife, and
since Donna Yun was not an insider of Scholastic, the SEC brought its
11
action under the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability.
Following a jury determination against them, the defendants moved
12
for judgment as a matter of law, or a new trial, contending that they
lacked the requisite state of mind insofar as Donna Yun, the alleged
13
tipper, did not intend to benefit from tipping Burch. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the
motions, holding that, under the misappropriation theory, a Rule
10b-5 violation did not require a showing that the tipper intended to

1356–57. The Court of Appeals did not focus on this issue, treating both possibilities
as equally subject to its analysis. See Yun, 327 F.3d 1263.
6
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268; Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. A put is an option
contract which gives the purchaser the right to sell a particular security at a
predetermined price at any time before a specified expiration date. LAWRENCE G.
MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 866 (3d ed. 1992). Since the put
option confers the right to sell at a certain price (the strike price), its value increases
algorithmically to the extent that the price of the underlying stock decreases below
the strike price. See id. at 838–39. A forty-eight hour option is a substantially risky
investment, being in essence a wager on the immediate short-term movement of a
stock’s price. If the underlying security is trading above the strike price at
expiration, the options are worthless. Burch’s two-day puts expired the day after
Scholastic’s scheduled earnings announcement.
7
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268.
8
Id.
9
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
10
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
11
See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1267; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (adopting misappropriation theory); infra Part I.B.
12
Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
13
Id. at 1350.
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14

benefit from the tip.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed, holding that the state-of-mind requirement for tippers was
15
the same—an intent to benefit from the tip —whether the tipper was
16
an outsider-misappropriator or a classic corporate insider.
The Commission’s effort, as exemplified in Yun, to curtail the
reach of the intent-to-benefit requirement is consistent with its
historically persistent advocacy of a far-reaching insider trading ban
17
under a theory of equal access to market information. The upshot
of the SEC’s approach is the imposition of insider trading liability
whenever a person trades with the benefit of an informational
imbalance, however gained. In opposition to the SEC’s push for
relatively unrestrained liability, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently limited the scope of Rule 10b-5 by interpreting the Rule
18
as an antifraud provision. As a result of the Court’s fraud-based
approach, insider trading liability has hinged on two prerequisites:
(1) a requirement of a breach of a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty as
19
supplying the requisite fraudulent act and (2) a state-of-mind
20
requirement that is consistent with a theory of fraud; for example,
14

Id. at 1353.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (holding that test for breach of duty
owed to corporation by corporate insider is whether tipping of inside information
would benefit tipper); infra notes 72–96 and accompanying text.
16
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280. The court noted the differing opinions on this matter
among the federal courts. Id. at 1274–75 & nn.25, 26. Compare id. at 1276 (requiring
an intent to benefit under misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 921336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) (applying
improper motive test under misappropriation theory), with United States v. Libera,
989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring breach of duty by tipper and knowledge
of breach by tippee, “without more”), and SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting improper motive test under misappropriation theory). See
also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting disagreement on issue but
declining to resolve it).
17
See infra Parts I.A, II.
18
See infra notes 31–45 and accompanying text.
19
See infra Part II.A.
20
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). The Yun decision also
highlights some of the ambiguities which have developed in civil actions for insider
trading regarding the state-of-mind requirement in general. The United States
Supreme Court’s early pronouncement that scienter was an essential element of Rule
10b-5 claims, Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197, 214, was followed by indications that a
lesser standard might suffice in certain situations. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (implying
a negligence standard by stating that tippee may be liable if he knew or should have
known his receipt of nonpublic information was result of impropriety). Moreover,
the Court’s deferral of the issue of whether recklessness is a sufficient standard for
liability, Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12, has predictably led to disagreement
among the federal courts. See, e.g., Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274–75 (rejecting recklessness
standard); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting
15
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the intent-to-benefit rule.
The facts of Yun provide a felicitous opportunity to explore this
tension between two opposing theories of insider trading liability as it
relates to the intent-to-benefit requirement, as well as more universal
concerns of the legitimacy and justifiable scope of the prohibition of
insider trading. Yun sets out two possible factual contexts in which an
illegal tip might have occurred. Either Jerry Burch was a chance,
inadvertent recipient of inside information when he overheard Mrs.
21
Yun’s telephone conversation, or he received the information by
means of a deliberate breach of confidence by Mrs. Yun when she
22
willfully divulged the information to him at a social gathering.
Under the SEC’s theory, there need be no intent to benefit from
23
providing a tip in order for there to be insider trading liability.
Thus, Jerry Burch would be liable for insider trading in either case,
simply because he took advantage of an informational imbalance,
without regard to how that advantage came about. The Commission
sought to accomplish this result by eliminating the intent-to-benefit
requirement when an action is brought under the misappropriation
24
theory of insider trading liability.
An exploration of the doctrinal underpinnings of insider trading
law will show, however, that this approach is inconsistent with the law
as the courts have interpreted it under Rule 10b-5. Analysis of the
25
seminal SEC decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. will reveal that the
recklessness standard). In Yun, although the appellate court disagreed with the trial
court on the state-of-mind issue, the higher court affirmed the denial of defendants’
motions for judgment as a matter of law since there was sufficient factual basis for
finding the intent standard had been met. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280. The court did,
however, grant the defendants a new trial based on the jury instructions given in the
lower court, which articulated a recklessness standard and did not include
instruction as to the intent requirement. Id. at 1282.
It should perhaps be noted that the state of mind required for criminal
prosecutions of inside traders is more clearly defined, both judicially and statutorily.
See generally Brian J. Carr, Note, Culpable Intent Required for All Criminal Insider Trading
Convictions After United States v. O’Hagan, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (1999). The present
analysis will be confined to the state-of-mind requirement for civil actions, where a
willful intent to violate the securities laws is not purported to be an issue. See id. at
1194–1210. It is also worth noting that civil actions under Rule 10b-5 are brought by
and large by the SEC. Although there is a judicially created implied private right of
action under Rule 10b-5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6 (1971), such actions are rarely brought, owing largely to statutory restrictions on
class actions for securities fraud and limits on damage awards. See STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 123–24 (1999).
21
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268.
22
Id.; Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57.
23
See Yun, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
24
See id.; infra text accompanying notes 243–48.
25
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).

2004

267

COMMENT

SEC’s current position is, and has been for some time, based on a
misconception of the idea of fairness as set forth in Cady, Roberts as
26
one of the doctrinal pillars of the insider trading ban. This analysis
will also show that the Supreme Court, in contrast to the SEC, has for
the most part correctly applied Cady, Roberts by emphasizing that the
Cady, Roberts rationale bases liability on the abuse of a relationship of
27
trust. This abuse, and not mere informational inequality, gives rise
to the unfairness inherent in insider trading. The exegesis of Cady,
Roberts will also confirm the notion, strongly implied in Supreme
28
Court decisions,
that the misappropriation theory is not
29
fundamentally distinct from the classical theory.
Part I of this Comment will survey the development of Rule 10b5 as a regulatory mechanism for the prosecution of insider trading.
Part I.A will trace the development of the classical theory of insider
trading, based on fiduciary duties owed to the shareholders with
whom an insider trades. The misappropriation theory of liability,
premised on duties owed to the source of the misappropriated
information, will be detailed in Part I.B. In Part II, the theoretical
and policy rationales underlying insider trading prohibitions will be
explored and analyzed afresh with an eye towards establishing a
doctrinal setting in which to analyze the intent-to-benefit
requirement. This discussion will take its cue from the seminal
30
opinion of former SEC Chairman William Cary in Cady, Roberts. The
dual prongs of the Cady, Roberts rationale, breach of trust and
fairness, will be analyzed in Parts II.A and II.B, respectively, to
determine their appropriateness vis-à-vis the insider trading
prohibition and the parameters that they should set for liability.
Finally, in Part III, the conclusions and insights gained in Part II
will be brought to bear on the current controversy (the state-of-mind
problem as exemplified in Yun), to resolve that particular issue and
to give more definite shape to the scope of the insider trading
prohibition in general.
I. BACKGROUND—THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING
31

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is an
enabling provision, the purpose of which was the prevention of
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 912; infra Part II.B.
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912; infra Part II.
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
See infra Part III.
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
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surreptitious manipulation of securities markets.
The statute
prohibits “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”
employed “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”
that contravenes any rules and regulations that the SEC may
promulgate “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
33
the protection of investors.” While the legislative purpose behind
section 10(b) seems to have been the regulation of abusive acts of
speculation and market manipulation that misrepresent the value
34
and liquidity of securities, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently construed the statute as a broader measure against
35
securities fraud.
36
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942 under authority of
section 10(b), was originally drafted in response to a particular
instance of market manipulation; namely, a corporate director falsely
talking down the corporation’s financial condition and then buying
37
the shares of credulous stockholders at a profitable discount. From
this rather humble and exigent beginning, the rule has become the
federal government’s indispensable weapon in combating insider
38
39
trading, a problem to which it was not originally addressed.
Rule 10b-5 prohibits “any person, directly or indirectly” from
“(a) . . . employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . or
(c) . . . engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
32

See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
33
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
34
Thel, supra note 32, at 385–86.
35
See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagen, 521 U.S. 642, 670 (1997) (stating that
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act is modeled on the antifraud provisions of section
10(b)) (citing Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985)); Central Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 198 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “acknowledged purpose” of section 10(b) is “to
strengthen the antifraud remedies of the common law”); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
646 (1983) (stating that section 10(b) is one of the antifraud provisions of the
Exchange Act).
36
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
37
See Conference on the Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793,
922 (1967) (remarks of co-drafter Milton Freeman), cited in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.32 (1976).
38
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s enduring remark on the phenomenon of Rule 10b-5
bears repeating: The rule had become “a judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 737 (1975).
39
Cf. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 578 (1991) (Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he law [of insider trading] is far enough down
th[e Rule 10b-5] road . . . that a court . . . has no option but to continue the route.”).
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connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” A line of
Supreme Court cases has articulated the necessary elements of any
Rule 10b-5 claim as those inhering in an action for common-law
41
fraud. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court limited
standing in civil actions brought under Rule 10b-5 to those who
traded in a security in connection with fraudulent activity proscribed
42
by the Rule. In holding that Rule 10b-5 did not proscribe mere
43
negligence, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder affirmed the scienter
requirement for Rule 10b-5 securities fraud.
The materiality
requirement of common-law fraud was subsumed under the federal
44
securities laws in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. Under the
Northway standard, an omitted fact is considered material “if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
45
important in deciding how to” act.
A. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading
Rule 10b-5 was first used to combat insider trading in the SEC’s
46
groundbreaking decision, In re Cady, Roberts. Cady, Roberts premised
40

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
42
Id. at 754–55.
43
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
45
Id. at 449. Northway involved the proxy rules of section 14(a). The standard
was adopted in the Rule 10b-5 context in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232
(1988). In insider trading cases, the standard is virtually self-satisfying. The very act
of trading speaks to the materiality of the inside information.
Causation is of particular interest in the securities fraud context. Assuming that
a hypothesis of efficient securities markets accurately reflects economic reality, which
in the high-volume, high-liquidity, impersonal securities exchanges is a fair
assumption, then securities prices reflect a discounting of all publicly available
information. This is the so-called “weak” efficient markets hypothesis. The strong
hypothesis, rather less adhered to, is that securities prices in efficient markets
discount all information, whether or not it is public and available. Interestingly, the
strong form of the hypothesis takes into account information reaching the markets
through clandestine channels, like insider trading. See generally Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
Similarly, any omissions or misinformation will also be discounted. It is therefore
reasonable to presume reliance, or transaction causation, whenever trades are
conducted on a national exchange in a security as to which there has been a material
misstatement or omission. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. This fraud-on-the-market
theory, id., makes causation in securities fraud cases a somewhat pat proposition.
The Supreme Court has accepted the presumption of reliance under the fraud-onthe-market theory. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972). But cf. Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn & Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that causation of actual pecuniary damages, or loss causation,
could not be presumed).
46
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
41
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liability for insider training on a willful violation of the federal
47
The opinion of SEC
securities laws, specifically Rule 10b-5.
chairman Cary pronounced what has become the accepted rule
governing insider trading and articulated the underlying doctrinal
rationale for its prohibition. The disclose or abstain rule prescribes
that insiders must either disclose nonpublic, material information to
which they are privy by virtue of their position as insiders or, if
disclosure would be improper or is not feasible, abstain from
48
trading. While officers, directors and controlling shareholders came
within the rule’s constraints,
[t]hese three groups . . . do not exhaust the classes of persons
upon whom there is such an obligation [to disclose or abstain
from trading]. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal
elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
49
with whom he is dealing.

The dual concerns of Cady, Roberts—respecting fiduciary
relationships and avoiding unfairness—have driven the federal
courts’ insider trading jurisprudence since SEC Chairman Cary
50
committed their expression to paper. These two prongs of the Cady,
Roberts rationale anchor contrary tendencies, which have since guided
and defined the debate over insider trading. On the one hand is the
Supreme Court’s dogged persistence in basing insider trading
liability on a breach of duty, and, on the other, the SEC’s ceaseless,
though largely futile attempts to broaden the scope of Rule 10b-5, in
the name of fairness, under a theory of equal access to information
51
for all market participants. The post–Cady, Roberts development of
insider trading law manifests the tension inherent in these opposing
viewpoints.
52
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., a paradigm insider trading
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
expressly adopted Cady, Roberts’ disclose or abstain rule under a
53
theory of equal access to information. Texas Gulf Sulphur involved
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 908–10.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 912 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Id. at 848.
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insider trading by corporate officers after the firm’s explorations
54
uncovered a potentially massive ore deposit in Ontario, Canada.
While the insiders were buying up TGS stock, the corporation was
buying all of the land and mineral rights in the area that it could.
Appraising the policy underlying Rule 10b-5, the court deemed
the congressional purpose behind the rule to be “that all members of
55
the investing public should be subject to identical market risks . . . .”
In holding that the disclose or abstain rule applied to anyone who
56
traded while in possession of material, nonpublic information, the
Second Circuit erected a daunting ban on trading with an
57
informational advantage, however gained. But the triumph of the
equal access theory in Texas Gulf Sulphur was not to abide.
58
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to trim back the broad prohibition of Texas Gulf Sulphur
59
by rejecting the equal access theory.
In an opinion by Justice
Powell, the Court emphasized the first prong of the Cady, Roberts
rationale, respecting fiduciary relationships. This reemphasis acted
to delimit the fairness consideration, which had been the dominant,
if not the exclusive doctrinal consideration in the Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision, by restricting its purview to those who have a duty to
60
disclose.
Vincent Chiarella worked for a printing company that printed
61
merger and acquisition documents. He managed to decrypt the
documents of his firm’s clients, discerned the identities of the
62
companies involved, and traded their stock. The Court read the
first Cady, Roberts prong narrowly, for although Chiarella had indeed
gained access to the information by virtue of insider status, he was not
an insider of the companies whose stock he had traded, and thus
63
owed neither them nor their shareholders any fiduciary duties.
Absent a duty to disclose, Chiarella’s silence could not render him
54

Id. at 843.
Id. at 852.
56
Id. at 848.
57
Under the Second Circuit’s all-encompassing rule, a local who observed the
hurried activities of TGS’s agents, took an educated guess as to what might be going
on, and bought shares of TGS stock, would presumably be liable for insider trading.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 47–48; see also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir.
2000) (providing example of similar set of circumstances).
58
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
59
Id. at 231.
60
Id; see also discussion infra Part II.
61
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 231.
55
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64

liable for defrauding anyone under Rule 10b-5. The Court expressly
rejected the lower court’s contention that Chiarella, by virtue of his
position as a regular recipient of material, nonpublic, corporate
65
information, owed a duty to all market participants. In other words,
the Court rejected the equal access theory’s insistence on
informational parity and identical market risks.
Chiarella is a pivotal insider trading case for several reasons.
First, the Supreme Court adopted Chairman Cary’s rationale in Cady,
66
Roberts for the ban on insider trading. At the same time, however, it
rejected the equal access theory then advanced by the SEC as
overbroad, and made clear the Supreme Court’s determination to
limit insider trading liability to instances where fiduciary duties were
disregarded—a person would not be liable for insider trading simply
because of an informational advantage. This, the Court implied, was
67
an erroneous reading of Cady, Roberts.
And finally, the Court
declined to adopt the misappropriation theory. Chief Justice Burger,
in dissent, argued that a duty to disclose should arise whenever
68
nonpublic information was gained improperly.
The majority
declined to address the matter only because it had not been raised
69
below. Chiarella is thus the model case for the classical theory of
insider trading, which requires that a fiduciary breach a duty to
70
The
disclose owed to the persons with whom he trades.
misappropriation theory would have to find sustenance among the
federal circuit courts until the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in
71
United States v. O’Hagan.
Tippee liability was analyzed within the classical liability
72
framework in Dirks v. SEC. Raymond Dirks was a stockbroker and
analyst who received inside information concerning Equity Funding
73
of America from Ronald Secrist, an insider at Equity Funding.
Secrist informed Dirks that Equity Funding had been deliberately
64

Id.
Id. at 233.
66
See id. at 226–28.
67
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–28, 232 n.14.
68
Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice’s argument plainly had
some force. See discussion infra Part I.B.
69
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
70
The SEC was also dissatisfied with the result in Chiarella. In response, it
promulgated Rule 14e-3, which prohibits anyone from trading on material,
nonpublic information regarding a tender offer, regardless of whether or to whom
fiduciary duties are owed. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2004).
71
521 U.S. 642 (1997). See discussion infra Part I.B.
72
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
73
Id. at 648–49.
65
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overstating its assets on a grand scale. Secrist, who had unavailingly
informed regulators of the fraud, asked Dirks to investigate the
matter and to disclose his findings. Dirks confirmed Secrist’s
allegations and, during the course of his investigation, discussed the
matter with clients and other investors. While Dirks himself did not
trade Equity Funding stock, his advisees liquidated substantial
74
holdings based on the allegations of accounting fraud. During this
time, the price of Equity Funding stock declined $11 per share, a
more than forty-percent drop. Trading on the New York Stock
Exchange was halted two weeks after Dirks began his investigation,
and the SEC subsequently uncovered the fraud after impounding the
75
corporation’s records.
Dirks himself, with consummate
bureaucratic irony, was implicated as a tippee. The SEC censured
76
Dirks under a theory that was an unabashed repudiation of Chiarella.
The Commission asserted that the disclose or abstain rule applied to
everyone who received material, nonpublic information from a
77
corporate insider, “regardless of their motivation or occupation.”
But, relying on the fiduciary duty rationale of Cady, Roberts, as
conceived in Chiarella, the Court both rejected the SEC’s assertion
that a tippee inherits an insider’s fiduciary duty simply by virtue of
the tip and repudiated the equal access theory upon which it was
78
based. The duty to disclose “arises from the relationship between
parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information
79
because of his position in the market.”
In other words, not
everybody who possesses inside information is barred by the federal
80
securities laws from trading.
While the Court agreed that a tippee’s duty to disclose was
81
derivative of that of the insider who provided the tip, it explained
that the duty is inherited not simply by virtue of the tip, but because
the tip constitutes a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty to
82
shareholders. “[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a
74

Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
76
Id. at 652 (citing In re Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17,480, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,939, at ¶ 83,951 (Jan. 22, 1981), rev’d, 463 U.S.
646).
77
Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 656–57 & n.15.
79
Id. at 658 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 n.14) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
80
Id. at 657.
81
Id. at 659.
82
Id. at 660. The Court distinguished a corporate officer’s common-law duty to
the corporate entity from his duty to the shareholders not to trade on inside
75
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83

breach of duty by the insider.” It follows that not all disclosures of
material, nonpublic information are breaches of the “Cady, Roberts
84
duty.” In a tipping case, therefore, the threshold inquiry is whether
85
the tipper breached a fiduciary duty in providing the tip. The Court
established the intent-to-benefit, or improper-motive test as a limiting
mechanism for determining whether the requisite breach had
86
occurred. The test provides that if the insider/tipper’s disclosure of
confidential corporate information results in a benefit to him, then
87
the insider has breached his Cady, Roberts duty. Only then can a
88
fiduciary duty be imputed to the tippee. For the insider’s duty to
pass to the tippee, it must further be shown that the tippee “kn[ew]
89
or should [have] know[n]” of the breach.
Thus, a tippee is
potentially liable for insider trading only if the tipper’s disclosure
results in a personal benefit to him, and if the tippee knows, or
should know, that he received the tip “in breach of a duty by a person
having a special relationship to the [corporation] not to disclose the
90
information.”
The personal benefit (or improper motive) test is not as
favorable to tippees as may appear at first blush, for the Court
defined “personal benefit” broadly. The benefit may be direct or
91
indirect. It could include a benefit to a tipper’s family member, for
92
example by making a gift of the tip. The Court further determined
that personal benefit was not limited to financial gain but might also
93
consist in a “reputational benefit.” For example, it might enhance
the tipper’s standing in a way that will later bring him a higher salary,
94
or more clients. In sum, if the tipper’s motive for disclosing the
information is an improper one, then the tippee will inherit a Cady,
Roberts duty if he knew (or should have known) of the impropriety of
information. See id. at 653 n.10. The latter is the “Cady, Roberts duty” to disclose or
abstain. Id. at 662. See discussion infra Part II.B. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20,
at 59 (speculating that Cady, Roberts duty might be a matter of federal law and distinct
from state-law duties of corporate officers).
83
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
84
Id. at 661–62.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 662.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660; see also id. at 661 (stating that tippee who knows of
breach by insider inherits duty, but not mentioning those who should know).
90
Id. at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Id. at 662.
92
Id. at 664.
93
Id. at 663.
94
See id.
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95

the tip. In Dirks, Ronald Secrist’s motive for tipping Dirks was to
uncover massive fraud at Equity Funding, not, the Court concluded,
96
to benefit personally.
B. The Misappropriation Theory
In absolving Raymond Dirks, the Dirks majority noted that he did
not “misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity
97
Funding.” This might have been a signal that the Court, given the
proper factual setting, would be willing to reconsider Chief Justice
Burger’s dissenting support in Chiarella of the misappropriation
98
theory. That factual setting was amply provided by James O’Hagan,
99
a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. Dorsey
& Whitney had been retained by Grand Metropolitan (“Grand Met”)
100
in its planned takeover bid of Pillsbury. O’Hagan became aware of
95

See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660.
Id. at 667. The Court’s language is mildly ambiguous on this point, alternating
between simply requiring that the tip result in a benefit to the tipper, id. at 662
(“[T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit . . . from his disclosure.”),
663 (test is “whether the insider receives a . . . benefit from the disclosure”), 667
(“The tippers received no . . . benefit.”), and speaking of the tipper’s motive or
purpose in making the tip. Id. at 662 (“Whether disclosure is a breach of duty . . .
depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure.”), 667 (“[T]he tippers were
motivated by a desire to expose the fraud.”). In turn, the lower courts have similarly
equivocated on the precise requirement. Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274
(11th Cir. 2003) (intent to benefit), with SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir.
2000) (simply a resulting benefit). Nevertheless, the tipper’s purpose is clearly the
point of the test. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (“Whether disclosure is a breach of duty
therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the disclosure.”).
The determination of whether the tipper breached a duty to shareholders and
whether the tippee inherited that duty is distinct from the determination of scienter,
or intent to defraud. Id. at 663 n.23. The benefit test, based on the tipper’s intent,
speaks to whether or not a tippee owes a duty to shareholders, see id. at 662, not
whether he himself acted with scienter when he traded, which is a separate inquiry.
See id. at 663. Thus, the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 applies separately to
tippees. See id. at 663 n.23. This follows from the Court’s earlier decision in Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Aaron was in turn a clarification of the Court’s decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which left undecided whether the
scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 applied in actions for injunctive relief. Id. at 193
n.12. In Aaron, the Court was unequivocal. The Ernst decision “ineluctably leads to
the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.” Aaron,
446 U.S. at 691.
97
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
98
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). As noted supra text
accompanying note 69, the majority in Chiarella did not reject the misappropriation
theory on doctrinal grounds, but rather because the government did not invoke the
theory at trial. Id. at 236.
99
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
100
Id.
96
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the proposed tender offer and began purchasing Pillsbury call
101
102
When the merger was announced,
options and common stock.
the price of Pillsbury shares nearly doubled and O’Hagan liquidated
103
his holdings for a profit of $4.3 million. O’Hagan was subsequently
indicted on fifty-seven counts, including mail fraud and violations of
104
Rules 14e-3 and 10b-5.
The unique nature of O’Hagan’s position vis-à-vis the
corporations affected by his scheme required that the
misappropriation theory be advanced as the basis of his conviction
for securities fraud. That is because O’Hagan’s fiduciary duties ran
to his law firm, and in turn to its client, Grand Met. O’Hagan,
however, traded the stock of Pillsbury, an entity to whom he owed no
105
duties at all. Since, under the classical theory of insider trading, the
requisite fraud inheres in the breach of a fiduciary duty to the
106
shareholders with whom one trades,
O’Hagan could not be
107
convicted under that theory. The misappropriation theory was thus
the only available theory upon which O’Hagan could be convicted.
The misappropriation theory had been circulating among the
federal circuits since before the Supreme Court first addressed it,
108
inconclusively, in Carpenter v. United States.
Carpenter involved a
journalist’s misappropriation of pre-publication information from the
109
Wall Street Journal’s “Heard on the Street” column. The Court split
4–4 on the issue of whether the reporter’s conviction under the
110
The judgment of the Second
federal securities laws could stand.
Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the defendant’s convictions based
111
on the misappropriation theory, was affirmed simply by reason of
112
the evenly divided Court. The appeals court had held that a breach
101

A call is an option contract that gives the purchaser the right to buy the
underlying security at a predetermined price at any time before a specified
expiration date. See MCMILLAN, supra note 6, at 855.
102
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48.
103
Id. at 648.
104
Id. at 648–49.
105
See id. at 653 n.5.
106
See supra notes 56–69 and accompanying text.
107
See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
108
484 U.S. 19 (1987). See generally Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory
of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United
States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 868–78 (2003) (discussing preO’Hagan development of misappropriation theory).
109
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22.
110
Id. at 24.
111
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S.
19 (1987) (4–4 decision).
112
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
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of a duty to one’s employer met the requirement of Rule 10b-5 that
there be fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though the misappropriator did not trade in his employer’s stock, but
113
in the stock of an unrelated entity.
The misappropriation theory was tailor-made for O’Hagan. One
court has succinctly stated the theory as:
provid[ing] that Rule 10b-5 is violated when a person (1)
misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching
a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and
(3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4)
regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of
114
the traded stock.

In O’Hagan, the confidential information regarded a corporate
merger and O’Hagan’s firm, and thus O’Hagan, owed a duty of
confidence to Grand Met, but not to the shareholders of Pillsbury,
115
whose stock he furtively traded. Moreover, O’Hagan’s exploits were
116
on their face particularly egregious.
The Supreme Court upheld
the misappropriation theory as a valid basis for convicting O’Hagan
117
under Rule 10b-5.
O’Hagan’s misappropriation of confidential
information, in breach of a duty owed to the source of that

113

See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had
previously adopted the misappropriation theory in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1981). In a subsequent series of cases, the courts in that circuit applied
the theory to various types of relationships. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d
596 (2d Cir. 1993) (print-shop employee’s duty to employer); Carpenter, 791 F.2d
1024 (journalist’s duty to his newspaper); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984)
(printer’s duty to employer); Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (investment banker’s duty to
bank); SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (psychiatrist’s duty to
patient); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (office manager’s duty to
employer); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.) (father–son
relationship), rev’d on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). But cf. United States
v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that requisite fiduciary
relationship between husband and wife not established for purposes of
misappropriation theory). The theory was also gaining favor in other circuits. See,
e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.
1990); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985). But see United States v.
O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting misappropriation theory), rev’d, 521
U.S. 642 (1997); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
114
SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
July 28, 1992) (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
115
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
116
See id. at 657 n.8, 659 (speaking of O’Hagan’s readiness to betray confidences
and the illogic of letting him off the hook simply because he defrauded one group as
opposed to some other group). Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The
Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993).
117
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659.

278

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:263

information, sufficed as the statutorily required “decepti[on] . . . in
118
connection with securities transactions.”
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, described the classical
theory of insider trading and the misappropriation theory as
119
“complementary.”
Both theories were designed “to protect the
120
integrity of the securities markets.” The classical theory is a net for
insiders (and their tippees) who threaten that integrity by abusing
121
their positions of trust within the corporation.
The
misappropriation theory is designed to snare outsiders (and their
tippees) who have access to corporate information through a
relationship that does not entail a duty to the corporation’s
shareholders, and who misappropriate that information for their
122
personal gain.
In spite of this expressed complementarity, there is
disagreement among the lower courts with regard to the
123
misappropriation theory’s scope and application, as well as a fair
124
amount of scholarly rancor over the issue.
The force driving the
debate is whether or not the two theories really are different aspects
of the same general theory, or whether they are in fact based on
125
unrelated doctrinal foundations.
This is the root of the
disagreement over the respective state-of-mind requirements for
126
tippee liability. Its resolution turns on a careful analysis of the two118

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 652.
120
Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121
See id. at 652–53.
122
See id. at 653.
123
Compare SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring intent to
benefit under misappropriation theory), and SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992) (applying improper
motive test under misappropriation theory), with United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d
596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring, “without more,” breach of duty by tipper and
knowledge of breach by tippee), and SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting improper motive test under misappropriation theory). See
also SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting disagreement on issue but
declining to resolve it).
124
See, e.g., Steven M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1999)
(complaining that the Supreme Court “ducked, misunderstood, or mishandled
virtually every issue presented by [the O’Hagan] case”). Cf. Randall W. Quinn, The
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the
(Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865 (2003)
(defending misappropriation theory).
125
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 124; David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A
Critique of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41 (1998).
126
See supra notes 8–24 and accompanying text.
119
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pronged rationale for the ban on insider trading as originally
conceived in Cady, Roberts—respecting relationships of trust and
fostering fairness in securities markets.
II. THE “CADY, ROBERTS DUTY” AND THE CONCEPT OF FAIRNESS
127

Outside of academia, the idea that insider trading should be
regulated is by and large an accepted norm of the American legal
128
and ethical landscape. This is due in no small part to former SEC
129
Chairman William Cary’s decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., which
continues to be the driving intellectual force behind the regulation of
130
insider trading.
Although the doctrinal basis for insider trading
131
regulation has shifted in emphasis and nuance over time, the Cady,

127

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 125–46 (surveying arguments in support of
deregulation of insider trading). But the prohibition of insider trading stems from a
legitimate social motive to curb certain manifestations of avarice. Cf. ARISTOTLE,
ETHICA NICHOMACHEA [NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS] bk. V, chs. 1–5.
Aristotle
characterizes the unjust or unfair man as the “grasping” or “overreaching” man. Id.
at 1129b10–11. The unjust man takes excessive pleasure in profit and as a result
grasps for more than his due of goods (or accepts less than his due of harms). See id.
at 1130a28–b5. Pace Gordon Gecko, see WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987),
if the impulse towards greed is left unchecked, certain segments of society will tend
to “create subcultures that glorify and rationalize selfishness.”
Donald C.
Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999). “[T]he deep belief that insider
trading is a wrong and needs a legal remedy . . . derives from the more fundamental
attitude that economic power and status demand a strong dose of self-restraint and
accountability.” Id. The mere existence of laws against insider trading is a powerful
social placebo; a symbol of society’s deep-seated disapproval of the alreadyadvantaged abusing positions of trust to grasp for even more. See id. Professor
Langevoort speaks of the “mythic” nature of the insider trading ban, meaning its
usefulness as a symbol of certain cultural values and experiences, as opposed to a
measure reflecting an empirically precise assessment of legal cause and effect. Id.
But see also infra note 204 for a discussion of the role that envy might play in the
insider trading debate.
128
This has not always been the case. The rule against insiders taking advantage
of their positions within the corporation to profit from nonpublic information about
the corporation’s stock price was slow in coming over the first half of the twentieth
century. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 8–14. The jurisdictions that did regulate
insider trading usually limited sanctions to face-to-face transactions where there was
clear evidence of fraud. Id.
On the other hand, Americans’ disapproval of insiders benefiting from their
advantage vis-à-vis securities markets is as old as the markets themselves. Alexander
Hamilton, as the nation’s first treasury secretary, forbade his treasury employees
from speculating in the then newly created government securities, which were the
objects of frenzied speculation at the time. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON
293 (2004).
129
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
130
See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1319.
131
See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Roberts concerns—respecting fiduciary relationships and ensuring
fairness with regard to informational advantages gotten from those
relationships—have remained the metajudicial fonts of all federal
insider trading law. From this central notion arises the Cady, Roberts
duty: A trader of securities might in certain circumstances have a duty
to disclose inside information in his possession or to abstain from
132
trading, when not to do so would be inherently unfair. Chairman
Cary stated the foundational principles underlying this duty with
perduring incisiveness:
[This] obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
133
is dealing.

Thus, it is seen that fairness is an element of the Cady, Roberts
rationale.However, the Cady, Roberts notion of fairness is not
tantamount to a broad imposition of equality on all market
participants. Rather, the “inherent unfairness” with which Cady,
Roberts is concerned arises only within certain relational contexts;
namely, those involving a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty.
A. The Cady, Roberts Duty to Disclose or Abstain
134

What has been referred to as the “Cady, Roberts duty” has its
source in the first prong of the preceeding passage: The duty “rests
[in part on] the existence of a relationship giving access . . . to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
135
and not for the personal benefit of anyone . . . .” Significantly, the
disclose or abstain rule requires a relationship; specifically, one
136
The
providing access to privileged corporate information.
existence of a relationship is thus paramount with regard to the
prohibition on insider trading, for without it, there arises no Cady,
137
138
Roberts duty.
Absent such a duty to abstain from trading,
132

Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911.
Id. at 912.
134
See supra notes 81–96 and accompanying text.
135
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
This is in essence what the duty to disclose or abstain amounts to, since more
often than not disclosure is impracticable and probably a breach of an officer’s statelaw duties. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 45–46.
133
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corporate insiders would be free to profit by trading on nonpublic
information.
The meaning of the word “relationship” requires clarification. It
139
is commonly (though imprecisely)
used to refer to merely
situational arrangements, as when one describes the location of one
object in relation to another object (i.e., their “spatial relationship”).
But “relationship” generally implies some kind of intersubjectivity;
140
that is, some kind of association between persons (whether legal or
natural). This is how the courts have tended to view the matter and,
in insider trading cases, the relationship at issue is by and large
141
viewed as fiduciary in nature.
The insistence on some special
142
relationship of trust and confidence is a conscious attempt by the
Supreme Court to bridle the tendency to treat all informational
143
imbalances as coming within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.
The Court
has been unwilling to expand liability beyond the scope of an
144
implicitly fraud-based rule in such a manner absent congressional
145
direction.
By contrast, the SEC has unflaggingly insisted that even merely
situational relationships should suffice to bring a person under the
146
strictures of the insider trading ban. This position is nothing more
147
than a permutation of the discredited equal access theory, and is
further flawed by the fact that it completely disregards the fraud basis
of Rule 10b-5. While “[s]ection 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall
148
provision . . . what it catches must be fraud.”
139

See MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1050 (11th ed. 2003).
See id.
141
See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 232 (noting that duty to disclose or abstain
arises only from a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence and
emphasizing that duty to disclose rests on “a specific relationship between two
parties”); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Chiarella approvingly); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
142
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228, 232.
143
See id. at 232 n.14 (“A duty arises from the relationship between parties . . . and
not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market.”).
144
See supra notes 31–45 and accompanying text.
145
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233–35.
146
See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1374 (2d Cir. 1978)
(agreeing with “SEC’s own view that anyone is subject to Rule 10b-5 disclosure
obligations if he or she has inside information obtained by reason of access to the
issuer”), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); SEC v.
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (involving SEC action brought against
college football coach who allegedly traded on information overheard at sports
event).
147
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231.
148
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234–35.
140
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Furthermore, since Rule 10b-5 has been construed as an
antifraud measure, the federal courts, and particularly the Supreme
Court, have been compelled to find an act of deception upon which
149
to premise liability.
It follows that for a breach of a state-law
fiduciary duty to suffice for liability under Rule 10b-5, there must be
150
“some element of deception.” Insider trading arguably provides the
requisite act of deception insofar as a breach of a duty to disclose
151
involves a deceit upon those to whom the duty is owed. Since the
Cady, Roberts duty is a duty to disclose, its breach qualifies as a deceit
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.
The actual source of the duty to disclose has been a somewhat
152
murky issue.
Common-law fiduciary duties of corporate managers
are owed to the corporation and derivatively to the corporation’s
153
shareholders. In Santa Fe v. Green, the Supreme Court rejected the
idea that breach of these state-law duties in themselves constituted a
154
violation of Rule 10b-5. The Santa Fe Court, however, left a narrow
opening in its holding for some “federal fiduciary principle under
155
Rule 10b-5. . . .”
But, it warned, any “federal fiduciary standards”
156
should not be so expansive as to “cover the corporate universe.”
157
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed this confusion,
somewhat parenthetically, by noting that the Cady, Roberts duty is
distinct from state common-law fiduciary duties owed by corporate
158
managers.
The origins of the Cady, Roberts duty are found, not surprisingly,
in the Cady, Roberts opinion itself. As originally conceived in Cady,
Roberts, an insider’s access to privileged corporate information
created a duty to the investing public, which included, but was not
149

See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977) (finding no
violation of Rule 10b-5 absent deceit or manipulation); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c)
(2004) (making it unlawful to practice or engage in any “fraud or deceit” in
connection with securities transactions).
150
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 475.
151
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29.
152
See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 192–93 (1991).
153
See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE pt. V, introductory note
(1992).
154
See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479–80 (holding, on federalism grounds, that Rule
10b-5 does not apply broadly to all instances of “internal corporate
mismanagement”).
155
Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
Id. at 480 (quoting William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 59–63.
158
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 n.10.
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exclusively comprised of, corporate shareholders.
Justice Powell
seems to have acknowledged this in his opinion in Dirks, where he
160
uses the phrase “Cady, Roberts duty” no less than six times. The Dirks
opinion may thus be read to some degree, at least implicitly, as
adopting Chairman Cary’s intended program for a federal common
law of insider trading that was separate and distinct from state
161
The fine distinctions of state law concerning the
corporation law.
nature of the fiduciary duties of corporate agents should not, the
Chairman argued, be invoked in order to take the bite out of federal
162
securities laws designed to protect investors and financial markets.
The Chairman presciently cautioned that in applying those laws,
163
judges should avoid erecting “artificial walls of responsibility.”
But that is often what the federal courts have tended to do.
Courts have at times added unnecessary confusion to insider trading
law by failing to distinguish the Cady, Roberts duty owed to investors
from state-law fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. In doing so,
they have missed sight of the doctrine’s underlying policy of
protecting investors from unscrupulous insiders and maintaining the
164
integrity of the nation’s financial markets by policing the unfair
abuse of privileged relationships. Adopting and adhering to this
germinal rationale for regulating insider trading would produce in a
more direct fashion results which the courts have been arriving at in a
contorted manner since the conception of the restrictions on insider
165
trading.
Moreover, an originalist approach that preserves the Cady,
Roberts roots of insider trading law would lend itself to a reasonable
mean between the terminal positions of complete deregulation of
159

See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910 & n.10, 915 n.29.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655, 660, 662, 663, 665, 666.
161
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910 n.10 (stating that Securities Exchange Act, in
effecting its purpose of protecting investors, “constitute[d in part a] far reaching
federal substantive corporation law”); Cary, supra note 156, at 700 (arguing for
federal fiduciary principles), cited in Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 480 n.17; Langevoort, supra
note 127 (discussing Chairman Cary’s project).
162
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 909. It is an unavoidable legislative fact that the
prohibition of insider trading is meant to protect investors. “It shall be unlawful . . .
[t]o . . . contraven[e] . . . such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate . . . for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (2000).
163
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913.
164
For an early acknowledgement of the effect of the law on maintaining the
public’s faith in economic institutions, see Veazie v. Williams, 49 U.S. 134, 154 (1850)
(expressing concern for adverse effects of fraudulent “puffing” by land auctioneers
on national real-estate market).
165
See Fisch, supra note 152.
160
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insider trading, and an overreaching imposition of equality on all
market participants.
The former position is defended on
166
predominantly, if not exclusively, economic grounds and is for all
167
practical purposes a purely academic matter. The latter position is
the result of a general misunderstanding of the concept of fairness
168
and a misreading of that concept as it is used in Cady, Roberts.
B. The Concept of Fairness
The fairness issue can be thought of as the battleground on
which insider trading law has been waged. But in order to be a
workable legal concept, fairness must be conceived within limitations
that serve to distinguish it from bare equality. These limits are to be
found in the Cady, Roberts rationale itself, and are reinforced by a
conceptual analysis of what it means for something to be fair.
The competing concepts engaged in the debate are
diametrically opposed viewpoints on the meaning and role of fairness
in the regulation of insider trading. On the one side is the historical
position of the SEC that fairness is essentially equality; if not an
absolute equality of information, then equality of access to
169
information.
At the other extreme, proponents of the Law and
Economics school argue that fairness is a vague and unhelpful legal
concept, of little value in terms of assessing the scope and legitimacy
170
of a prohibition against insider trading.
Both positions are open to criticism. On the one hand, fairness
need not, and in fact can not, especially in the case of securities
171
markets, be identified with equality. Both in general conceptual
terms, and as expressed in the Cady, Roberts decision, the concept of
fairness must be interpreted with certain constraints that tend to
delimit its scope and render it something other than simple equality.
A philosophical explication of this semantic truism is found in John
172
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness. Under that theory, “fairness” is

166

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 125–45.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
168
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
169
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
170
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 323–30.
171
See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 16 (1984) (observing that broad
reading of concept of fairness “would ban virtually all trading activity” since trading
by nature depends on informational inequalities).
172
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
167

2004

COMMENT

285

defined as describing those social and legal institutions that people
would choose while in a hypothetical state of ignorance about their
173
own personal status, needs, and predilections.
The resulting
hypothetical social contract might therefore adopt certain
inequalities if they were objectively deemed to inure to the benefit of
174
all.
These inequalities are fair by definition. Rawls’ contractarian
theory provides a compelling argument against equating fairness with
simple equality.
On the other hand, the concept of fairness is only vague (and
hence useless) when it is conceptualized in overbroad and fuzzy
terms. When properly articulated, a concept of fairness is seen to be
a fundamental social virtue, which is a proper and legitimate concern
of a culture’s legal institutions, insofar as the human sentiment for
175
fairness is the underlying source of a basic sense of justice. As such,
fairness is indeed an essential legal concept. Seen in this light, when
the concept of fairness, as expressed in the Cady, Roberts rationale, is
correctly interpreted and applied, it bestows legitimacy on the
prohibition of insider trading and is seen as a sensible and intuitive
foundation for that prohibition.
One broad and fuzzy interpretation of the idea of fairness is the
equal access theory; though it is not without some degree of merit, if
a venerable pedigree is any indication of merit. The theory made an
176
early appearance in Laidlaw v. Organ, a somewhat obscure opinion
by Chief Justice John Marshall involving international politics and the
tobacco market. The Treaty of Ghent had just put an end to the War
of 1812 and opened up previously closed commodities markets. One
effect of the treaty was an increase in demand for, and hence in the
price of, tobacco. The buyer in Laidlaw knew about the treaty. He
had received the news directly from the fleet which had brought it
from Europe, and in fact had awoken early to conduct his business
177
178
before the news was disseminated.
The seller knew nothing.
When he asked the purchaser about any news that might impact the
173

Id. at 136–42.
See id. at 95–96.
175
See id. at 111–12.
176
15 U.S. 178 (1817).
177
Id. at 183.
178
Id. at 182–83. An ancient permutation on the equal access theory was
advanced by Cicero, in a scenario involving corn rather than tobacco. After
assembling ancient opinion on the matter, Cicero concluded that good faith and
social harmony require a vendor to disclose to a vendee any market information in
his possession. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS [ON DUTIES] bk. III, §§ 50–72.
According to Cicero, it would be unethical “to plunder another’s ignorance.” Id. §
72 (author’s trans.).
174
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179

price of the commodity, the buyer was silent.
Marshall decided in favor of the purchaser because the
information concerning “extrinsic” market circumstances was
180
publicly available.
The fact that the purchaser was in an
advantageous position with respect to the news was not
determinative; nor was the fact that the buyer was silent in the face of
a request for any news. The Court essentially concluded that the
buyer owed no duty of disclosure to the seller simply because he
181
possessed an informational advantage.
The district judge had concluded that the vendee’s
182
nondisclosure of the information constituted fraud, in essence
finding a duty among all market participants to disclose material
183
information.
The lower court espoused a view that fairness
demands equality of information in the context of contractual market
184
This is a strong admonition, demanding not just
transactions.
equal access to information, but equal results of that access; to wit,
parity of knowledge. Chief Justice Marshall’s resolution of the issue
was to retreat to the less stringent (and at least conceivably
185
practicable) equal access theory. When market information is
“equally accessible to both parties,” enforcing a duty of disclosure,
Marshall argued, would be “difficult to circumscribe within proper
186
limits.”
The blurring of fairness and equality evinced or implied in the
187
opinions of both the district judge and the Chief Justice is common,
and persists among current-day advocates of the equal access theory.
179

Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 188–89.
Id. at 194.
181
See id.
182
Id. at 184–85.
183
Cicero came to the same conclusion for the sake of good faith and social
concord. CICERO, supra note 178, §§ 69–70.
184
Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 184–85. Basing his argument on what appears to be a
misunderstanding of Roman civil law, the district judge seems to have overlooked the
distinction made in his sources between legal duties and moral obligations as well as
between market information and information about the item of commerce itself. See
id. at 191 note c.
185
Marshall’s phrase is “intelligence of extrinsic circumstances,” as opposed to
intrinsic information about defects in the item itself. Id. at 194.
186
Id.
187
Cf. RICHARD T. LAPIERE, A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 199–200 n.8 (1954)
(warning against confusing equality, which is “almost never found in the social
relationships of human beings” and equity, viz. fairness, which is “everywhere and
always insisted upon”), quoted in HELMUT SCHOECK, ENVY: A THEORY OF SOCIAL
BEHAVIOUR 282–83 (Liberty Press 1987) (1966); SCHOECK, supra, at 282 (discussing
“[t]he confusion of justice and equality, so common today”).
180
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But Marshall’s reasoning in Laidlaw has at least one virtue. Mere
situational advantages, such as that of the buyer in Laidlaw, are not
188
the type of advantages that should give rise to a duty to disclose. By
189
implication, there is nothing “inherent[ly] unfair[]” about such
situations. Jerry Burch exemplified this set of circumstances when he
190
overheard Mrs. Yun’s telephone conversation.
Merely standing
within earshot of an insider while he discusses material, nonpublic
information does not constitute the kind of relationship that gives
rise to a Cady, Roberts duty. Likewise, standing at the wharf when the
fleet arrives with news that might affect market prices does not
involve a special relationship which gives one privileged access to
191
information not meant for personal use.
In general, simply being
fortuitously present somewhere does not give rise to any type of
relationship that is not merely situational.
Correspondingly,
informational imbalances are not unfair per se, but only when they are
192
the result of some sort of privileged, non-situational relationship.
This limited notion of fairness is the essence of the Cady, Roberts
rationale. In Cady, Roberts, “inherent unfairness” is defined as a
function of the relationship giving rise to the duty to disclose or
193
abstain.
An insider’s trading is considered unfair when he
appropriates privileged information obtained as a result of his
relationship to the corporation giving him access to that
194
information. As one federal district court had explained a decade
prior to Cady, Roberts:
The duty of disclosure stems from the necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from utilizing his position to take unfair
advantage of the uninformed . . . . It is an attempt to provide
some degree of equalization of bargaining position . . . . One of
the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act . . . was to
outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers . . . for

188

See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. at 193–94.
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
190
See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2003); see also SEC v. Switzer, 590
F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that there was no duty to disclose or abstain
in case of famed college football coach who overheard conversation between CEO
and his wife while sunning on bleachers behind them and then traded on
inadvertently communicated information).
191
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
192
Cf. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951) (stating
that informational imbalances are unfair when resulting from a person’s insider
status).
193
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
194
Id.
189
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195

their own financial advantage.

When a correct understanding of the Cady, Roberts rationale
informs Rule 10b-5’s prohibition of insider trading, fairness, instead
196
of being simply a matter of informational equality, is meant to
197
provide “some degree of equalization” to compensate for the
imbalance created by an insider’s privileged position.
Fairness, then, like justice, aims at restoring an artificial social
equality that is meant to correct imbalances created by certain
morally neutral advantages, like insider status, or superior physical
strength, so that such advantages cannot be used to the detriment of
198
those less advantaged. Fairness can thus be thought of as reflecting
199
the socio-legal process of restoring balance. In the insider trading
context, equilibrium and its disruption depend on a logically prior
imperative not to take advantage of a position of trust for one’s own
200
personal benefit; in other words, not to breach one’s Cady, Roberts
duty. Seen in this light, the duty to disclose or abstain acts to limit
201
the potential breadth of the fairness requirement.
The Supreme Court’s decisions have by and large incorporated
this conceptualization of the rule against insider trading by requiring
202
a breach of a duty of trust or confidentiality. The SEC, on the other
203
hand, has generally eschewed restraints on the concept of fairness,
and instead would rather see fairness stretched to the extent that it
becomes virtually conterminous with equality. The equal access
theory is the foremost manifestation of this approach to insider
trading law.
The attempt to eliminate the intent-to-benefit
requirement under the misappropriation theory is a nuance on the
same theme—it is an attempt to snare those whose market advantage
is merely situational and not a result of a special relationship as

195

Speed, 99 F. Supp. at 829.
See Macey, supra note 171 (asserting dependency of market activities on
informational imbalances). Cf. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1326 (“[One] strongly
suspect[s] that disturbingly large numbers of people are actually led to trade by the
belief . . . that they themselves have some sort of inside advantage.”).
197
Speed, 99 F. Supp at 829.
198
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 164–65 (2d ed. 1994). In the case of the
strong man, justice intervenes to restore social equilibrium, ordinarily by means of
compensation, when the strong man has used his strength to injure another. Id. at
165.
199
See id. at 159.
200
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
201
See id.
202
See supra notes 134–68 and accompanying text.
203
See supra notes 169–201 and accompanying text.
196
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204

defined in Cady, Roberts.
Viewed as a whole, the two-pronged Cady, Roberts rationale for
prohibiting insider trading reduces in broad terms to a duty not to
205
act unfairly.
This duty is imposed only on those who have “a
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
206
personal benefit of anyone.” The duty is breached by “[t]he abuse
of informational advantages that other investors cannot hope to
207
208
overcome through their own efforts.” The “inherent unfairness”
that the law is meant to address is a function of the Cady, Roberts
rationale as a coherent whole, and not just the existence of
informational inequality. Keeping an eye on this holistic view of the
204

Looked at another way, there is nothing inherently unfair about a mere
situational advantage, also known as luck. Luck is by nature random. Cf. ARISTOTLE,
PHYSICS bk. II, ch. 5 (describing luck as a fickle and indeterminate cause). This
means that, over time, it will be equally distributed. Thus, in the long term, good
fortune is not at all unfair, even though in the short term it might befall us unevenly.
But the fact that a particular instance of good (or bad) fortune is a random event
means that any cries of “unfair!” in the face of pure chance can be little more than
envy, or jealousy, as the case may be. See generally SCHOECK, supra note 187. If fairness
is conceived as a matter of the just distribution of goods, see Bernard Williams, The
Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 2D SERIES 120 (Peter Laslett &
W.G. Runciman eds., 1962), then if good fortune is equally likely to befall anyone,
there is simply no issue of unfairness. A sentiment that would begrudge another his
good fortune, with no gain to oneself, is little more than envy-fueled resentment. See
JOSEPH EPSTEIN, ENVY: THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS 21 (2003) (characterizing “pure” envy
as particularly “ugly” when the envier “doesn’t even require any advantage for
oneself but is perfectly content to make sure that the next person derives no
advantage”); SCHOECK, supra note 187, at 19 (defining envy as the spiteful wish that
another’s possessions or achievements be taken from him with no corresponding
benefit to the envier). It has been argued that envy is a universal and essential
human characteristic that is too often overlooked by social scientists. SCHOECK, supra
note 187, at 34. Envy conceivably provides at least a partial explanation of social
phenomena as disparate as black magic and progressive income taxes. See generally id.
In fact, Freud, with characteristic audacity, derives the very institution of human
justice from primordial feelings of envy. SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 67 (James Strachey, trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989)
(1922). See also EPSTEIN, supra, at 21 (noting the blurry line between a sense of
injustice and feelings of envy). But even apart from such a bold theory, there is little
doubt that envy plays some role in the opprobrium with which society views insider
trading. See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1329 (suggesting that envy plays role in
society’s disapproval of insider trading). When this envy is directed at actual
wrongdoing, it can be deemed constructive, or legitimate envy. See SCHOECK, supra
note 187, at 296. Misdirected, however, envy has no redeeming social value.
205
Cf. John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY:
A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (positing a “prima facie duty of fair play” for
social interaction in general).
206
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
207
H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 5 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2278.
208
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
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prohibition against insider trading, as grounded in the Cady, Roberts
opinion, an informed and coherent understanding of the scope and
meaning of the intent-to-benefit rule should come into view.
III. THE INTENT-TO-BENEFIT REQUIREMENT FOR TIPPEE LIABILITY
209

The Yun case involved the tipping of inside information. The
alleged inside trader (Jerry Burch) was not an actual insider, but
received inside information from a putative insider (Mrs. Yun).
210
Under the Cady, Roberts rationale, properly understood, trading in
securities is proscribed only when it would be inherently unfair.
Inherent unfairness, in turn, results from a breach of a duty of trust,
and not simply when an informational imbalance inheres in a given
trade. Thus, unless a fiduciary-like duty could be imputed to Jerry
Burch with respect to his relationship with Mrs. Yun, there should be
no liability for insider trading. The intent-to-benefit rule is one
means of imputing such a duty between a tipper and his tippee.
The prohibition of insider trading would be a dead letter unless
there were rules covering tippees—persons who obtain inside
information from those having the requisite relationship of access,
and hence a Cady, Roberts duty to disclose or abstain, but who
themselves have no such relationship, and therefore no
211
corresponding Cady, Roberts duty.
In the context of the classical
212
theory, the Supreme Court deftly addressed this matter by holding
that an insider’s Cady, Roberts duty is transposed to a tippee when the
tip was made with an improper motive to personally benefit the
213
tipper in some way, and the tippee knew of the impropriety.
This
standard for tippees is at the same time a sensible expansion and
limitation of liability. As noted, a doctrine expanding liability to
tippees is necessary if the prohibition is to have any teeth. And since
Cady, Roberts bases insider trading liability on misconduct vis-à-vis a
relationship of trust, a tippee, like anybody, may only be implicated
for insider trading if he can also be implicated in a breach of that
trust. The intent-to-benefit rule of Dirks provides a test to determine

209

See supra Introduction.
See supra Part II.
211
Cf. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (concerning relationships giving access to
inside information either “directly or indirectly”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004)
(prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive devices either “directly or indirectly”).
212
But cf. Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1339 (arguing that personal benefit test
never amounted to the refining concept that the Court had hoped it would).
213
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660–61 (1983); see also supra text accompanying
notes 72–96.
210
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whether or not such an imputation is justified.
The improper motive test, or personal benefit test, relates
directly to the issue of fairness, which arguably is the doctrinal pillar
215
upon which insider trading law is poised.
The test ties in directly
with the Cady, Roberts prohibition against an insider taking advantage
of “information intended to be available only for a corporate
216
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”
As
217
formulated in Dirks, the rule against insider trading is designed to
exonerate tippees who did not gain possession of the information as a
218
result of wrongdoing. Ronald Secrist, for example, was not abusing
219
his insider status for improper personal gain, and hence the Cady,
Roberts concern with fairness, that is, with restraining abuses of
relationships of confidence, was not implicated.
220
Dirks was brought under the classical theory of insider trading.
221
In Yun, the SEC argued that the intent-to-benefit requirement for
tippee liability set forth in Dirks did not apply in misappropriation
cases because the basis of the misappropriation theory was distinct
from that of the classical theory under which the Dirks rule had been
222
articulated.
The SEC suggested that the intent-to-benefit
requirement was “inextricably linked to” duties owed to corporate
shareholders and that, since the justification of the misappropriation
theory is that the trader owes no such duties, the benefit rule was
223
inapposite.
There is no justification, however, for this different treatment of
214

See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660–61. The additional requirement of knowledge on the
part of tippees is somewhat ambiguous but adds little to the analysis. When the
analytically prior breach of duty by the insider is present, knowledge by the tippee is
unlikely to be an issue. It seems to amount to no more than knowing that the insider
is deliberately conveying inside information to the tippee. All of the cases to date
analyzed by this author that exonerate tippees are based not on the lack of an
appropriate state of mind on the part of the tippee, but on the fact that there was no
breach by the insider in the first place. See, e.g., Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (finding no
breach by insider, therefore no tippee liability); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding no per se duty owed to family members, therefore no
breach); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (finding no breach
when insider talking to his wife is unwittingly overheard by a third party).
215
See discussion supra Part II.B.
216
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
217
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64.
218
See id. at 667; see also supra text accompanying notes 72–96.
219
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
220
Ronald Secrist, the alleged tipper, was an insider of Equity Funding, and the
ultimate tippees traded in the stock of Equity. Id. at 648–49.
221
Yun, 327 F.3d 1263.
222
See id. at 1275.
223
Id.
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the misappropriation theory, which has been described as “the
224
In repeatedly
abstain or disclose theory’s fiduciary cousin.”
requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty as a prerequisite to a Rule 10b-5
violation, the Supreme Court is faithfully following the rule as
originally interpreted in Cady, Roberts. There is no Cady, Roberts duty
unless there is a relationship giving access to privileged
225
information.
Relationships of this sort are very often fiduciary in
nature. But even when they are not, strictly speaking, state-law
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders, they are sufficiently fiduciarylike that the presence of a fiduciary duty is a reliable indicator of a
226
coexisting Cady, Roberts duty. By confusing the indicator (fiduciary
duty) with the thing indicated (Cady, Roberts duty) courts sometimes
took it for granted, without comment, that the duties in question
227
were owed to shareholders qua shareholders.
But the Supreme
228
Court has noted that the two duties are not identical.
224

Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1334.
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
226
Cf. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (“The misappropriation theory is thus designed to
‘protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by ‘outsiders’ . . . who
owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s shareholders.’”) (emphasis
added).
227
This also treats federal insider trading law as an aspect of state corporate law,
an approach which the Supreme Court has rejected. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977). Keeping the Cady, Roberts duty to all market participants
distinct from corporate officers’ state-law fiduciary duties to shareholders helps
assuage the criticism that the Supreme Court has completely ignored the federalism
concerns it raised in Santa Fe. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 20, at 111–12.
228
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (noting that Cady, Roberts duty is
distinct from state-law fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers); see also supra
text accompanying notes 152–65.
Characterizing duties under the classical theory as owed to one type of entity
(the corporation whose stock is being traded) and under the misappropriation
theory as owed to another (the corporate source of the information) also makes it
tempting to view liability under the two theories as, respectively, agency-based and
property-based. Though nothing conceptually prevents a separate action for
misappropriation of trade secrets or conversion of corporate property, when such
theories are feasible (which will not always be the case), section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
are not concerned with theft, at least not directly, but with duties of fairness owed to
investors by those in privileged positions. See discussion supra Part II. “[I]nsider
trading is prohibited to protect against unfairness.” Langevoort, supra note 127, at
1334. The policy goal of Rule 10b-5, as originally interpreted in Cady, Roberts, is to
enforce duties of fairness owed to the investing public (whose status as shareholders
of one entity or another is simply incidental) by those who would abuse positions of
privileged access to information. See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. While
intellectual property law can be a more or less relevant aspect of insider trading law
(under both theories) it cannot be said that insider trading law is property-based.
Ostensibly, it is fraud-based. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Donald
C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement,
70 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1982) (arguing that fraud basis of insider trading law is really
225
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Moreover, in O’Hagan, Justice Ginsburg took care to emphasize
the symmetrical relationship between the misappropriation theory
and the classical theory:
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to
capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale
of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts;
the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of
nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a
duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the
information. The misappropriation theory is thus designed to
protect the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by
“outsiders” to a corporation who have access to confidential
information that will affect the corporation’s security price when
revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that
229
corporation’s shareholders.

The Court’s language makes it clear that the misappropriation
theory is motivated by the same concerns, and meant to address the
230
same ills, as the classical theory. Indeed, one can say that they are
not really separate theories at all, but the same theory applied to
different circumstances. The classical theory is designed to net the
231
actual corporate insider.
The misappropriation theory, on the
other hand, is meant to snare the outsider who, for all practical
purposes, should be treated as an insider, because his conduct
contravenes the Cady, Roberts proscription and its foundational
concern with the unfairness that results from the abuse of certain
232
privileged relationships.
There is no reason why the Cady, Roberts
prohibition should not extend to abuses of special relationships that
give access to information that would otherwise escape sanction
simply because of the fact that violated duties run to certain persons
rather than to others. As Chief Justice Burger saw it, “Congress
a version of constructive fraud). But cf. Raymond L. Baribeault, Jr., Note, Insider
Trading: The Current Move Toward Increasing Civil and Criminal Liability for an Ill-Defined
Crime and the Need for a Definition, 14 VT. L. REV. 79, 79 (1989) (“[C]ourts have failed
to develop any rational principles in applying the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act . . . to insider trading.”).
229
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53 (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
230
The misappropriation theory is entirely consistent with Chairman Cary’s
project for a broad federal common law of insider trading. See Langevoort, supra
note 127, at 1323.
231
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
232
Under both theories the misused information has been misappropriated. This
detracts somewhat from the significance of the label “misappropriation theory” as
characterizing only one of the two theories.
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cannot have intended one standard of fair dealing for ‘white collar’
233
insiders and another for the ‘blue collar’ level.”
What Justice Ginsburg refers to as complementarity in O’Hagan
234
is explicable in terms of the “open texture” of Rule 10b-5. All laws
are beset by some degree of vagueness, due in part to the nature of
235
language.
But it is this very vagueness that imbues law with the
flexibility that is necessary to meet the infinite variety of human
236
experiences.
The open texture of law is what keeps lawyers and
judges out of hock, for it is the basis for the innumerable questions of
237
The courts’
interpretation that arise with respect to legal rules.
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 provides a paradigmatic application of
238
this phenomenon.
The underlying legal precept that anchors the
process and remains constant is the Cady, Roberts rationale
239
proscribing unfair abuses of certain fiduciary-like relationships. As
the courts have encountered widely divergent real-life situations
which intuitively fall under the Cady, Roberts rubric, they have
exploited the open texture of Rule 10b-5 in attempting to arrive at a
just outcome. The misappropriation theory is a manifestation of this
dynamic flexibility. It is not distinct from the classical theory insofar
as both theories are rooted in the same underlying precept, which
necessarily remains a constant throughout the interpretive process.
In the end, Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals offered what is probably the most forceful argument against
the SEC’s position that the two theories involve different elements of
liability. The judge warned that courts should avoid “construct[ing]
an arbitrary fence” between the two theories and “unduly
dichotomizing . . . insider trading liability,” which “essentially would
allow the SEC and the courts to ignore precedent involving the
classical theory of liability whenever the SEC brings its actions under
240
a misappropriation theory, and vice versa.”
The attempt to treat the misappropriation theory differently
from the classical theory when it comes to tippee liability is little more
than an effort to supplant the Supreme Court’s careful and
deliberate refinement of the Cady, Roberts rationale and to resurrect
233

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
HART, supra note 198, at 128.
235
Id.
236
See id. at 128–29.
237
See Langevoort, supra note 127, at 1340.
238
See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. S7 (1993).
239
See Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912; see also discussion supra Part II.
240
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2003).
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the ill-defined and unsophisticated equal access theory, which the
241
Court resolutely rejected in Chiarella. Like the equal access theory,
a theory that would implicate a trader whose informational advantage
242
was gotten simply by virtue of his “position in the market” is an illfated and misguided attempt to equalize market risks. As long as
Cady, Roberts is to be taken seriously as providing the doctrinal
justification for a ban on insider trading, any such attempts at market
equalization should be rejected as incompatible with the objectives
and motives of insider trading law.
243
The case of Donna Yun and Jerry Burch provides an apt
practical illustration of why the two theories should not be doctrinally
bifurcated, and demonstrates that the intent-to-benefit test must be
applicable under both theories if logical absurdities are to be
avoided. If Mrs. Yun herself had traded on the information conveyed
to her by her husband, she would have to be held liable under the
misappropriation theory, since the prerequisite breach of duty by her
244
husband was lacking.
But Mrs. Yun did not trade. Instead, she
tipped Jerry Burch in either (or both) of two ways: either
245
inadvertently while talking on the telephone, or purposefully
246
during a cocktail party.
Under the SEC’s theory, these two
situations should be treated no differently from each other, at least as
far as Burch is concerned. Since there would be no intent-to-benefit
requirement, it would make no difference whether Mrs. Yun
deliberately tipped Burch for some personal reason or inadvertently
leaked the information while conversing on the telephone. But
assume, arguendo, that Burch himself directly overheard the
conversation between the Yuns and then traded on what he had
gleaned. Since Burch owed no duties to the source of the
information (Mr. Yun and Scholastic Books) he would be off the
hook. And yet there is no substantial difference between the
circumstances of Burch overhearing Mrs. Yun’s conversation with her
lawyer and overhearing her conversation with her husband. In both
247
situations he benefited from a mere situational advantage.
But,
depending on which conversation he overhears, he is liable in one

241

See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231.
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244
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
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case but not in the other. This reductio ad absurdum is a further (and
final) verification of the weakness of the SEC’s position in Yun.
CONCLUSION
The Cady, Roberts decision not only set the stage for federal
insider trading law; it has also directed the interpretation of Rule 10b5 for roughly the past half century. The decision articulated the
rationale for prohibiting insider trading which still drives courts’
thinking on the matter: enforcing duties of fairness in securities
transactions against those whose positions of trust within a
corporation give them access to information which it would be
impossible for others to obtain legally. To effectuate this goal, the
federal courts have developed and applied two versions of a theory of
liability based on the principles of Cady, Roberts. Both involve the
misappropriation of privileged information. The classical theory
applies to insiders who trade in their own company’s stock. The
misappropriation theory expands the insider trading rule to cover
those who are not insiders in the classical sense, but who benefit from
some relationship giving them access to nonpublic corporate
information. Other than having different objects, the theories are
indistinguishable in their goals and motivation. Treating the two
theories as having different requirements, and in particular different
state-of-mind standards for tippee liability, threatens to fragment and
complicate an area of law that already suffers from an acute identity
249
crisis. Until Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgates a new, hopefully more focused and precise legislative or
regulatory statement on insider trading, the present body of doctrine
must be applied as coherently and consistently as possible in order to
further the policy goals first set forth by Chairman Cary and
seemingly agreed upon, at least by tacit implication, by the majority
250
of jurists and lawmakers. Distinctions as to the elements of a cause
of action under the different theories of liability should be avoided
absent a substantive doctrinal justification. In the case of the
248

This odd result is exacerbated by the fact that, in the hypothetical scenario,
Burch got his information from an actual agent of the corporation, and is
exonerated, while in the actual case he would be liable for trading on third-party
hearsay, which would generally be somewhat less reliable and might amount to no
more than rumor or speculation. See Stuart Sinai, Rumors, Possession v. Use, Fiduciary
Duty and Other Current Insider Trading Considerations, 55 BUS. LAW. 743, 743 (2000)
(“When is it appropriate for prosecutorial discretion to turn trading in securities
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personal benefit test for tippee liability, no such justification has been
put forth; nor is one likely to be. In sum, any attempts to
misappropriate the misappropriation theory from its Cady, Roberts
foundations must remain unsuccessful. Although the majority of
judicial opinion is in accord with this view of the matter, there is
some disagreement. The resolution of this disagreement becomes
clear when it is seen that the misappropriation and the classical
theories of insider trading liability are two sides of the same Cady,
Roberts coin—which, at least for now, is the coin of the realm.

